Eisangelia. Ou melhor: tomem cuidado, mensaleiros e sanguessugas!

O costume de falar com a boca cheia de “democracia”, não raro, faz esquecer o pleno significado do conceito. Não existe tal regime sem que o povo seja o soberano. É com base neste pressuposto que os inglêses do século 17, os Levellers, retomaram a idéia do impeachment, quando uma autoridade (rei, deputado, juiz, bispo) não cumpria a lei e não prestava contas dos recursos naturais, econômicos, humanos, no ato, ao povo. Tal é o fundamento da “accountability”. É também o mesmo núcleo de noções que determina o recall nos USA. O debate sobre tais pontos deveria partir da gênese democrática, verificar se eles podem e devem ser assumidos hoje, e quais as garantias de sua aplicação sem desvios despóticos, demagógicos, etc. Seguem abaixo duas breves exposições sobre a eisangelia, forma de punir governantes infiéis e que prejudicam o erário público. É bom notar que os promotores que os acusavam sofriam multas e outras penas caso sua causa não tivesse bom fundamento. Este é um ponto relevante, nos dias de hoje, no Brasil.

Primeiro Trecho:

“We come now to eisangeliai. An eisangelia (we might translate it as an 'impeachment') was a process directed against crimes which were considered as serious threats to the social or public order and were thought to demand prompt action. For a long time the prosecutor was not subject to the risk of a penalty of 1,000 drachmai and loss of civic rights should he desist from his prosecution or fail to secure a fifth of the votes of the dicasts; but that privilege evidently came to be so seriously abused by sycophants that in the latter half of the fourth century it was abolished, although only in respect of exemption from the fine, for the exemption from atimia continued. Arbitrators (diaitêtai) did not hold an office which was classed as an archê, and so were not liable to a formal examination of the discharge of their duties (euthynai); but they were exposed to eisangelia if accused of misconduct. The procedure was also available against anybody alleged to have done wrong to orphans or heiresses (reflecting the central importance to Athenian society of the family and hence also of the property of the family). But the most important category of eisangeliai concerned those alleged to have committed 'crimes against the state', viz. attempts to overthrow or subvert the constitution, and other acts of what anybody would call 'treason'; serious misconduct by anyone in the performance of a public duty (the boulê could deal with such cases only up to its maximum permitted penalty of 500 drachmai); the taking of bribes by a speaker to promote measures against the interest of the state; and what was in general called 'deception of the dêmos'. Indeed, eisangelia threatened to become something of a 'catch-all' process, rather like the Roman law of maiestas, since the definition of what can be construed as a crime against the state is always bound to be somewhat nebulous. probably as the exclusive, forum for these hearings.Nevertheless, every trial of an eisangelia had always to be authorized by a decree (psêphisma) of the ecclêsia, which sometimes specified the penalty to be imposed if the case were found to be proven. David Stockton : The Classical Athenian Democracy (Oxford University Press, 1990).

Segundo Trecho:

“The Assembly was indeed the controlling body of the state. This is perhaps shown most clearly in the procedure known as eisangelia, which means denunciation on a charge of treason or conspiracy against the state. At each ekklesia kyria, held once in every prytany, any citizen could begin the procedure of eisangelia by denouncing any officer of the state, or even a private citizen, and for such a motion no probouleuma was required from the Boule. If the Assembly was convinced that there was a case to answer, it then decided whether to try the case at a special meeting of the Assembly itself (which it did in important cases) or to refer it to the courts. The notorious trial of the generals after the battle of Arginoussai in 406 was the result of an eisangelia, and shows the power of the Assembly, for good or ill, over the officers of the state. John Thorley : Athenian Democracy (Routledge, 2004).



Terceiro trecho:


"Eisangelia. Properly, an announcement made in presence of a legal authority. In Attic jurisprudence eis- angelia was a special form of public prosecution, instituted especially for offences which appeared to inflict injury, directly or indirectly, upon the state, but which it was impracticable to prosecute under the regular and customary procedure. The accusation was put into writing and handed in to the senate; if the senate received it, the accused was arrested, or had to get three persons to stand surety for him. But if the charge were one of treason, or an attack upon the constitution, this was not allowed. If the voting on the guilt or innocence of the accused were unfavourable, the senate itself fixed the penalty, suppos_ ing it fell short of the amount which lay within its competence (500 drachmae…). If not, the senate referred the case at once to one of the courts of the Helliaea, or even to the ecclesia, to which the prosecutor might, indeed, have applied from the first. If the ecclesia decided to take up the case, the first thing it did was to fix the penalty, in case there were no legal provisions on this point. It then either entered on the investigation and decided the case, or handed it over to a court of law. The name eisangelia was also given to the prosecution of judges in office for neglect of their duties ; and to certain charges lodged before the archons : namely, charges against children for ill-treatment of parents, against husbands for ill-treatment of heiresses, and against guardians for ill-treatment of their wards." (Seyffert, Dictionary of classical antiquities)

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Quarto trecho:

Por iniciativa de Solon o Areópago “julgou os acusados de conspiração para dissolver a democracia, com a lei da denúncia (eisangelia) a qual permitiu a Solon tratar com eles" (Aristoteles, Constituição de Atenas, 8.4, tr. Rhodes). Odile de Bruyn, La compétence de l'Aréopage en matière de procès publics. Historia Einzelschrift 90. Stuttgart: Steiner 1995, in Bryn Muir Classical Review

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Quinto trecho:

Spectator, The, Sep 19, 1998 by Jones, Peter


"Eisangelia Athenian...

ANCIENT Athenians would have thoroughly approved of the American system of special prosecutors, activated when the Attorney-General suspects the possibility of official foul play. In highly democratic Athens, any citizen could bring an eisangelia (`impeachment') against anyone (including private citizens) for offences against the social or public order like treason bribery and deception of the people. But the system had its weaknesses, and the most famous case has some relevance to President Clinton's dilemma.

In 415 BC, the Athenian fleet was gathering to sail against Sicily - a very risky strategy in the war against Sparta - when the admiral on whom all hopes were pinned, the brilliant Alcibiades was implicated in two sacrilegious acts. Alcibiades' enemies saw their chance, and one Thessalus brought an eisangelia against him before the people's Assembly, accusing him of `committing sacrilege against the goddesses . . . in that he made a mockery of the Mysteries'.

Alcibiades, reckoning the Assembly was on his side, demanded that the case be heard at once: such a matter could not be allowed to rest before the expedition to Sicily. His enemies, aware of his popularity but feeling they could whip up resentment against him in his absence, managed to ensure that the Assembly gave him his sailing orders. Off he went; his enemies got the propaganda machine going (`secret plot to overthrow democracy'); and very soon the people, wishing they had tried him in the first place, called him back to impeach him. Wisely, Alcibiades defected. A catastrophe in Sicily ensued.
When is an impeachment a stitch-up? `Parodying the Mysteries' could stoke up superstitious fears, but the `threat to democracy' was non-existent. Alcibiades' enemies wanted him out at any cost (and Alcibiades knew it). The result -- defeat in Sicily - was devastating.

So, does a president threaten his country's security or its political and industrial clout by pathetically covering up an affair with some moronic intern? (Greeks would have died laughing at the charge.) If he broke the law, was he deceiving the people? If so, do the people care? Then consider the price of a mid-term dismissal - Al Gore, for pity's sake. Congress must distinguish between murky feuding over personal morality and its major responsibility the national interest.

Peter Jones helps to run Friends of Classics.

Copyright Spectator Sep 19, 1998_Provided by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.
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Para informações mais amplas, leia-se o livro de

HANSEN, M. H. Eisangelia: The Sovereignty of the People's Court in Athens in the Fourth Century BC (Odense U. Classical Studies, 4; 1974).

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Seria uma “inovação” instaurar no país o princípio do recall norte-americano, ou do impeachment como procedimento costumeiro e não excepcional? Uma questão a ser examinada com prudência, mas não descartada liminarmente. Creio que a ausência de mecanismos semelhantes seja uma das causas mais profundas da arrogante impunidade que define nossos políticos, magistrados, e outros.

Roberto Romano