We came so close to World War Three that day
James Forsyth and Douglas Davis
Wednesday, 3rd October 2007
On 6 September, when Israel struck a nuclear facility in Syria...
A meticulously planned, brilliantly executed surgical strike by Israeli jets on a nuclear installation in Syria on 6 September may have saved the world from a devastating threat. The only problem is that no one outside a tight-lipped knot of top Israeli and American officials knows precisely what that threat involved.
Even more curious is that far from pushing the Syrians and Israelis to war, both seem determined to put a lid on the affair. One month after the event, the absence of hard information leads inexorably to the conclusion that the implications must have been enormous.
That was confirmed to The Spectator by a very senior British ministerial source: If people had known how close we came to world war three that day there‚d have been mass panic. Never mind the floods or foot-and-mouth ˜ Gordon really would have been dealing with the bloody Book of Revelation and Armageddon.‚
According to American sources, Israeli intelligence tracked a North Korean vessel carrying a cargo of nuclear material labelled Œcement‚ as it travelled halfway across the world. On 3 September the ship docked at the Syrian port of Tartous and the Israelis continued following the cargo as it was transported to the small town of Dayr as Zawr, near the Turkish border in north-eastern Syria.
The destination was not a complete surprise. It had already been the subject of intense surveillance by an Israeli Ofek spy satellite, and within hours a band of elite Israeli commandos had secretly crossed into Syria and headed for the town. Soil samples and other material they collected there were returned to Israel. Sure enough, they indicated that the cargo was nuclear.
Three days after the North Korean consignment arrived, the final phase of Operation Orchard was launched. With prior approval from Washington, Israeli F151 jets were scrambled and, minutes later, the installation and its newly arrived contents were destroyed.
So secret were the operational details of the mission that even the pilots who were assigned to provide air cover for the strike jets had not been briefed on it until they were airborne. In the event, they were not needed: built-in stealth technology and electronic warfare systems were sophisticated enough to Œblind‚ Syria‚s Russian-made anti-aircraft systems.
What was in the consignment that led the Israelis to mount an attack which could easily have spiralled into an all-out regional war? It could not have been a transfer of chemical or biological weapons; Syria is already known to possess the most abundant stockpiles in the region. Nor could it have been missile delivery systems; Syria had previously acquired substantial quantities from North Korea. The only possible explanation is that the consignment was nuclear.
The scale of the potential threat —and the intelligence methods that were used to follow the transfer— explain the dense mist of official secrecy that shrouds the event. There have been no official briefings, no winks or nudges, from any of the scores of people who must have been involved in the preparation, analysis, decision-making and execution of the operation. Even when Israelis now offer a firm Œno comment‚, it is strictly off the record. The secrecy is itself significant.
Israel is a small country. In some respects, it resembles an extended, if chaotic, family. Word gets around fast. Israelis have lived on the edge for so long they have become addicted to the news. Israel‚s media is far too robust and its politicians far too leaky to allow secrets to remain secret for long. Even in the face of an increasingly archaic military censor, Israeli journalists have found ways to publish and, if necessary, be damned.
The only conceivable explanation for this unprecedented silence is that the event was so huge, and the implications for Israeli national security so great, that no one has dared break the rule of omertà. The Arab world has remained conspicuously ˜ and significantly ˜ silent. So, too, have American officials, who might have been expected to ramp up the incident as proof of their warnings about the dangers of rogue states and WMDs. The opposite is true. George Bush stonewalled persistent questions at a press conference last week with the blunt statement: ŒI‚m not going to comment on the matter.‚ Meanwhile the Americans have carried on dealing with the North Koreans as if nothing has changed.
The Syrian response, when it eventually came, was more forthcoming but no more helpful. First out of the blocks was Syria‚s ambassador to the United Nations, Bashar Ja‚afari, who happily announced that nothing had been bombed in Syria and nothing had been damaged.
One week later, Syria‚s Vice-President, Farouk a-Shara, agreed that there had, after all, been an attack —on the Arab Centre for the Studies (sic) of Arid Zones and Dry Lands (ACSAD). Brandishing a photograph of the Arab League-run plant, he declared triumphantly: ŒThis is the picture, you can see it, and it proves that everything that was said about this attack was wrong.
Well, perhaps not everything. The following day, ACSAD issued a statement denying that its centre had been targeted: ŒLeaks in the Zionist media concerning this ACSAD station are total inventions and lies,‚ it thundered, adding that a tour of the centre was being organised for the media.
On Monday, Syria‚s President, Bashar Assad, offered his first observations of the attack. The target, he told the BBC disingenuously, was an unused military building. And he followed that with vows to retaliate, Œmaybe politically, maybe in other ways‚.
Meanwhile, the Washington Post noted that the United States had accumulated a growing body of evidence over the past six months ˜ and particularly in the month leading up to the attack —that North Korea was co-operating with Syria on developing a nuclear facility. The evidence, according to the paper, included Œdramatic satellite imagery that led some US officials to believe the facility could be used to produce material for nuclear weapons‚. Even within America‚s intelligence community, access to that imagery was restricted to just a handful of individuals on the instructions of America‚s National Security Adviser, Stephen Hadley.
Why are all sides so reluctant to clarify the details of this extraordinary event? ŒIn the Middle East,‚ noted Bret Stephens, a senior editorial executive at the Wall Street Journal and an acute observer of the region, "that only happens when the interests of prudence and the demands of shame happen to coincide". He suggested that the "least unlikely‚ explanation is a partial reprise of the Israeli air strike which destroyed Iraq‚s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981.
Another of the Œleast unlikely‚ possibilities is that Syria was planning to supply its terrorist clients with "dirty‚ bombs, which would have threatened major cities through–out the world. Terrorism is a growth industry in Syria and it is only natural that, emboldened by its Iranian ally, the Syrian regime should seek to remain the market leader by supplying the ultimate weapon to Hezbollah, Hamas and a plethora of Palestinian rejectionist groups who have been given house-room in Damascus.
The Syrians have good reason to up the ante now. The Alawite regime of Bashar Assad is facing a slew of tough questions in the coming months ˜ most particularly over its alleged role in the murder of the former Lebanese leader, Rafiq Hariri, and its active support for the insurgency in Iraq. Either of these issues could threaten the survival of the regime. How tempting, then, to create a counter-threat that might cause Washington and others to pull their horns in ˜ and perhaps even permit a limited Syrian return to Lebanon?
But that does not explain why the consignment was apparently too large to be sent by air. Look deeper and you find an array of other highly plausible explanations. The North Koreans, under intense international pressure, might have chosen to Œpark‚ a significant stockpile of nuclear material in Syria in the expectation of retrieving it when the heat was off. They might also have outsourced part of their nuclear development programme ˜ paying the Syrians to enrich their uranium ˜ while an international team of experts continued inspecting and disabling North Korea‚s own nuclear facilities. The shipment might even —and this is well within the "least unlikely‚ explanations" have been intended to assist Syria‚s own nuclear weapons programme, which has been on the cards since the mid-1980s.
Apart from averting the threat that was developing at Dayr as Zawr, Israel‚s strategic position has been strengthened by the raid. Firstly, it has ˜ as Major General Amos Yadlin, the head of Israel‚s military intelligence, noted ˜ Œrestored its deterrence‚, which was damaged by its inept handling of the war in the Lebanon last year. Secondly, it has reminded Damascus that Israel knows what it is up to and is capable of striking anywhere within its territory.
Equally, Iran has been put on notice that Israel will not tolerate any nuclear threat. Washington, too, has been reminded that Israel‚s intelligence is often a better guide than its own in the region, a crucial point given the divisions between the Israeli and American intelligence assessments about the development of the Iranian bomb. Hezbollah, the Iranian/Syrian proxy force, has also been put on notice that the air-defence system it boasted would alter the strategic balance in the region is impotent in the face of Israeli technology.
Meanwhile, a senior Israeli analyst told us this week that the most disturbing aspect of the affair from a global perspective is the willingness of states to share their technologies and their weapons of mass destruction. ŒI do not believe that the former Soviet Union shared its WMD technology,‚ he said. "And they were careful to limit the range of the Scud missiles they were prepared to sell. Since the end of the Cold War, though, we know the Russians significantly exceeded those limits when selling missile technology to Iran."
But the floodgates were opened wide by the renegade Pakistan nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who is revered in Pakistan as the Father of the Islamic Bomb. Khan established a virtual supermarket of nuclear technologies, parts and plans which operated for more than a decade on a global stage. After his operation was shut down in 2004, Khan admitted transferring technology and parts to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Proliferation experts are convinced they know the identities of at least three of his many other clients: Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria.
In addition to selling nuclear-related knowhow, the Khan network is also believed to have provided Syria with centrifuges for producing enriched uranium. In 2003, concern about Syria‚s nuclear ambitions was heightened when an experimental American electronic eavesdropping device picked up distinctive signals indicating that the Syrians had not only acquired the centrifuges but were actually operating them.
If Israel‚s military strike on Dayr as Zawr last month was surgical, so, too, was its handling of the aftermath. The only certainty in the fog of cover-up is that something big happened on 6 September ˜ something very big. At the very least, it illustrates that WMD and rogue states pose the single greatest threat to world peace. We may have escaped from this incident without war, but if Iran is allowed to continue down the nuclear path, it is hard to believe that we will be so lucky again.
Douglas Davis is a former senior editor of the Jerusalem Post and James Forsyth is online editor of The Spectator.
High Level Debate Stalled Syria Air Strike
U.S. Was Concerned Over Intelligence, Stability to Region, Officials Tell ABC News
The September Israeli airstrike on a suspected nuclear site in Syria had been in the works for months, ABC News has learned, and was delayed only at the strong urging of the United States.
In early July the Israelis presented the United States with satellite imagery that they said showed a nuclear facility in Syria. They had additional evidence that they said showed that some of the technology was supplied by North Korea.
One U.S. official told ABC's Martha Raddatz the material was "jaw dropping" because it raised questions as to why U.S. intelligence had not previously picked up on the facility.
Officials said that the facility had likely been there for months if not years.
"Israel tends to be very thorough about its intelligence coverage, particularly when it takes a major military step, so they would not have acted without data from several sources," said ABC military consultant Tony Cordesman.
U.S. Cautious After Flawed Iraq Intelligence
A senior U.S. official said the Israelis planned to strike during the week of July 14 and in secret high-level meetings American officials argued over how to respond to the intelligence.
Some in the administration supported the Israeli action, but others, notably Sect. of State Condoleeza Rice did not. One senior official said the U.S. convinced the Israelis to "confront Syria before attacking."
Officials said they were concerned about the impact an attack on Syria would have on the region. And given the profound consequences of the flawed intelligence in Iraq, the U.S. wanted to be absolutely certain the intelligence was accurate.
Initially, administration officials convinced the Israelis to call off the July strike. But in September the Israelis feared that news of the site was about to leak and went ahead with the strike despite U.S. concerns.
The airstrike was so highly classified, President Bush refused to acknowledge it publicly even after the bombs fell.
ABC's Martha Raddatz filed this report for "World News With Charles Gibson."
„We came so close to World War Three"
This article about Israel‚s Sept 6 raid on Syria
One month after the event, the absence of hard information leads inexorably to the conclusion that the implications must have been enormous.That was confirmed to The Spectator by a very senior British ministerial source: ŒIf people had known how close we came to world war three that day there‚d have been mass panic. Never mind the floods or foot-and-mouth ˜ Gordon really would have been dealing with the bloody Book of Revelation and Armageddon. A few paragraphs later, it lays out the logical reasons for thinking that whatever Israel destroyed, it was mighty important and incredibly dangerous.
What was in the consignment that led the Israelis to mount an attack which could easily have spiralled into an all-out regional war? It could not have been a transfer of chemical or biological weapons; Syria is already known to possess the most abundant stockpiles in the region. Nor could it have been missile delivery systems; Syria had previously acquired substantial quantities from North Korea. The only possible explanation is that the consignment was nuclear.
The scale of the potential threat —and the intelligence methods that were used to follow the transfer — explain the dense mist of official secrecy that shrouds the event. There have been no official briefings, no winks or nudges, from any of the scores of people who must have been involved in the preparation, analysis, decision-making and execution of the operation. Even when Israelis now offer a firm Œno comment‚, it is strictly off the record. The secrecy is itself significant.
Both the secrecy and the lack of any response from the Syrians or anyone else make the strike significant. When the Israelis destroyed Iraq‚s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, it most of the world was quick to denounce it. The UN Security Council passed a condemnatory resolution (what else does the UN do?). Even President Reagan publicly condemned it and the US temporarily withheld shipping some aircraft that the Israelis had bought. The Iraqis themselves howled and Saddam promised to rebuild the destroyed reactor.
But after the Syria raid? Crickets. Even the UN hasn‚t said boo about it. Why? And why does an unnamed highly placed British official think that we came so close to world war that day?
Some of the reasons aren‚t difficult to game out. Syria is allied to Iran, both are allied at least tacitly to Russia and both are militarily supplied by both Russia and China. It was an advanced Russian air defense system that the Israelis penetrated without any trouble. China in turn is one of Iran‚s largest energy customers
The question is, then, why didn‚t the Syrians respond at all? I‚m not necessarily talking about a military response; Israel‚s raid had proven beyond doubt that whatever weapons Syria has, they‚re inferior to those that Israel has. Syria could have responded with increased Hezbollah attacks, or it could have protested as Iraq did after Osirak, with noisy condemnations and fist-pounding at the UN. But it‚s been quiet about the September raid so far. Why?
You could answer that Syria is quiet about the raid because it‚s guilty of whatever the Israelis suspected, but an Arab state‚s guilt has not often slowed it down from accusing a non-Arab state and particularly Israel of crimes. Saddam was guilty in 1981, but he protested as loud as possible anyway and most of the world took his side. Are the soil samples that the Israeli commandos picked up damning enough to keep Assad from protesting, fearing that the Israelis will release their findings? That doesn‚t seem likely to me. He could call it „Zionist lies‰ and have half the world on his side. US liberals would compare the Israeli report to the Powell testimony prior to the 2003 Iraq war and that would be that.
The best explanation for Assad‚s lack of protest is that the Israelis have threatened Assad himself. After last summer‚s flyby
So his lack of response probably comes down to his awareness that Israel possesses a credible threat of force against him. The September raid presented him with a moment of total clarity, so he stays mum. And if he´s not protesting an attack on his own soil, then who else is there to raise a peep in protest for him?
